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China’s rights defence movement has not long been a focus of atten-tion, but its background, significance, and strategies, as well as keypersonalities and cases, have been analysed in an increasing number
of articles. This article will mainly analyse how legal professionals in the
rights defence movement use the Internet – in particular social media such
as microblogs (weibo) – in various rights defence activities, as well as the
influence that the Internet is likely to have on the movement.
The rise of the rights defence movement and
its social factors
The year 2003 is generally regarded as a symbolic year for the rights de-
fence movement (weiquan yundong维权运动). Cases such as Dr. Jiang Yany-
ong’s exposure of the true face of the SARS crisis, (1) the death of a young
university-educated designer, Sun Zhigang, in a Custody & Repatriation cen-
tre, the arrest of village financier Sun Dawu, (2) the Li Siyi incident, (3) the ar-
rests of Internet activist Liu Di (4) and Internet essayist Du Daobin, (5) the
participation of independent candidates in local-level people’s congress
elections, and other such public incidents attracted the participation of
lawyers, scholars, journalists, and dissidents and had enormous social reper-
cussions. At the end of 2003, scholars began to refer to 2003 as the year
when China’s “new civil rights movement” (minquan yundong 民权运动)
was launched. (6) Not long afterward, the phrase “rights defence movement”
increasingly replaced “civil rights movement” and became a focus of analysis
by foreign media and some China watchers. A seminal moment occurred at
the end of 2005, when Yazhou Zhoukan made 14 “Chinese rights defence
lawyers” its collective “persons of the year.” (7)
The rights defence movement has overlap and affiliation with the dissident
movement and the democracy movement (minzhu yundong 民主運動). 
He Qinglian believes that the rights defence movement mainly demands per-
sonal rights, while the democracy movement demands public power. (8) Hu
Ping’s comparison of the two concludes, “The rights defence movement has
increasingly moved from spontaneous to conscious. In today’s China, rights
defence activities are drawing ever closer to the democracy movement, the
two combined constituting a powerful force promoting political reform.” (9)
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1. In 2003, while the Chinese authorities were claiming to have brought the SARS crisis under control,
Jiang Yanyong, a retired doctor at Beijing’s 301 Military Hospital, sent a letter to the news media
stating that China’s Public Health Ministry was covering up the true situation, and that the figures
published in the official media were a gross understatement.
2. Rural industrialist Sun Dawu won acclaim for a speech he delivered at Peking University about
the nation’s rural areas, agriculture, and farmers. On 27 May 2003, he was arrested and held for
more than five months on suspicion of “illegally absorbing public funds.” The case engendered a
strong reaction in the Chinese and international media, and in China’s intellectual community.
3. On 4 June 2004, a drug addict named Li Guifang was arrested for theft and sent to a drug reha-
bilitation centre. She repeatedly pleaded with the police to notify family members to look after
her three-year-old daughter, Li Siyi, who had been left home alone. The police ignored her pleas,
and the child was discovered dead of starvation on 21 June.
4. A student at Beijing Normal University, Liu Di, who used the online name “Stainless Steel Rat,”
was taken away by Beijing State Security police on 7 November 2002, drawing waves of protest
from the intellectual community.
5. Writer Du Daobin, employed in a medical insurance management office in Yingcheng City, Hubei
Province, was arrested in October 2003 after publishing a series of essays and taking part in ap-
peals on the Internet.
6. Wang Yi, “Minquan yundong: Juli women zi you yi gongfen” (The civil rights movement: Just a
centimetre away), Xinwen zhoukan, 24 November 2003; Di Feng, “Xin minquan yundong nian”
(The year of the new civil rights movement), and Wang Yi, “2003 gongmin quanli nian” (Civil rights
year 2003), in Xinwen zhoukan, 22 December 2003.
7. “Zhongguo weiquan lüshi fazhi xianfeng” (China’s rights defence lawyers, the vanguard of rule of
law), Yazhou Zhoukan (Hong Kong), 25 December, 2005.
8. He Qinglian, “Zhengqu siquanli de weiquan huodong yu yaoqiu quanli de minzhuhua yundong”
(The rights defence movement, fighting for personal rights and interests, and the democratisation
movement, demanding power), http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/HE-Qinglian/kd060604-
5.gb.html (consulted on 20 August 2012).
9. Hu Ping, “Weiquan yu minyun” (Rights defence and the democracy movement), HRIC Biweekly,
no. 12, 5 November 2009.
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ABSTRACT: The rise of China’s rights defence movement has occurred in tandem with the rapid development of the Internet in China. Various
forms of rights defence inside and outside of the courtroom have emerged and developed alongside changes to China’s ideological, political,
and legal systems and social structure. Similarly, Internet technology such as microblogs and other social media are enriching the modalities
of activity in the rights defence movement, enhancing the mobilisation capacity of activists, and accelerating the systematisation of popular
rights defence, profoundly affecting China’s ongoing political transformation.
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The Internet has made communications between various intellectuals and
activists extremely frequent and convenient. The identities of rights defenders
and democracy activists are increasingly merging and overlapping. The con-
sensus among the various parties is progressively enlarging, and they are
jointly participating in an ever greater number of activities. Although the rights
defence movement and democracy movement have different emphases, a
trend of mutual support, cooperation, and collaboration has emerged.
The main social factors in the rise of China’s rights defence movement
are as follows:
(a) Development of the legal system and legal profession. After the Cultural
Revolution ended, China’s legal system embarked on a difficult resurrec-
tion process. In particular, the introduction of the Administrative Proce-
dure Law (1989), the introduction and refinement of the Criminal
Procedure Law (1979, 1997), the restoration of the legal profession
through the introduction of the Law on Judges (1995), Law on Procura-
tors (1995), and Law on Lawyers (1996), and the implementation of na-
tionally unified judicial examinations provided legal and litigative
channels for defending civil rights, as well as the embryo of a legal pro-
fessional community. At the same time, traditional ideological discourse
(“class struggle,” “Cultural Revolution”) had to be abandoned, and the
authorities moved toward a new ideological discourse and strategy ex-
emplified by “reform and opening,” “ruling the country in accordance
with law” (yifa zhiguo 依法治国), (10) “Three Represents,” and “harmo-
nious society.” In particular, putting forward “rule of law” and adding
“human rights” to the Chinese Constitution made it possible for civil so-
ciety to turn these concepts into more than just empty phrases. Rule of
law discourse coupled with laws and regulations provided space for
rights defence activities. The very influential Sun Zhigang case in 2003
was a classic example of using official discourse and the legal system to
carry out a civil campaign. (11)
(b) Space for traditional and new media. Although traditional media are
strictly controlled, (12) they are not completely bereft of space. While
under pressure from official ideology and censorship, they also face the
pressure of the market. For this reason, the traditional media ( journalists
with a sense of social responsibility) regularly employ strategies that
allow some hot button rights defence issues to appear in print. (13) In ad-
dition, the rise of online media has greatly challenged the official media
monopoly, changing China’s discourse ecology and even the concept of
the media. As a result it will have a tremendous influence on China’s
rights defence movement and political transformation.
(c) Space for civil activity enlarged by development of the market economy.
Although China’s rapid economic development has brought many prob-
lems, such as vast income disparity, government-business collusion, and
environmental depredation, there is no denying that the vast majority
of ordinary people have seen their living standards enhanced, and this
has provided an economic foundation for the rights defence movement.
Resource mobilisation theory emphasises the discretionary time and
money needed for social movements. (14)
(d) Dissemination of liberal thought (ziyouzhuyi sixiang 自由主义思想) and
expanded consciousness of civil rights. “In the latter half of the 1990s, a
major trend among China’s intellectuals was the resurrection of liberal-
ism by a group of scholars who intended through reflection, research,
and advocacy of liberalism to fully realise modernisation and give ex-
pression to the resources of principle and thought of constitutional
democracy.” (15) Publishers introduced a large number of liberal works
and translations, and intellectual circles expressed enormous interest in
the dissemination of liberalist thought. “Upon entering the minds of the
Chinese, the theories of liberalism inevitably entered their daily lives.” (16)
At the same time, the public’s rights consciousness and awareness of
rule of law was also growing. This formed the conceptual basis for the
rights defence movement. Furthermore, the process of economic devel-
opment was accompanied by a progressive relative deprivation, which
provided the socio-psychological conditions for the rights defence
movement. (17)
(e) The efforts of democracy activists. In the years following 1989, students
and ordinary citizens who had participated in the democracy movement
suffered severe repression, and society was permeated with an atmos-
phere of desolation and terror. Even so, protests and efforts in the fight
for democracy were never abandoned. The Tiananmen Mothers Cam-
paign, (18) the open letter movement, (19) the organisation of political par-
ties, underground publications, and other such activities of civil dissent
continued unabated, accumulating resources of morality and justice and
to a certain degree expanding the space for civil society activities. In this
way, the rights defence movement was a successor to the democracy
movement. (20)
The development of China’s Internet
In China, the rise of the rights defence movement and the development
of the Internet evolved simultaneously and influenced each other. (21) China
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10. Editor’s note: For a discussion of “rule of law,” “rule by law,” and related terminology, see e.g. Albert
Chen, “Towards a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law,”
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, vol. 17, 2000, p. 125.
11. Keith J. Hand, “Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms
of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 45,
no. 1, 2006. See also Teng Biao, “Sun Zhigang shijian: Zhishi, meijie yu quanli” (The Sun Zhigang
incident: Knowledge, media, and power), http://blog.boxun.com/hero/tengb/19_1.shtml, and Liu
Xiaobo, “Minjian weiquan yundong de shengli” (The triumph of the popular rights defence move-
ment), BBC, 6 July 2003, http://blog.boxun.com/hero/liuxb/91_1.shtml (links consulted on 20
August 2012).
12. Regarding official strategies for controlling the media, see He Qinglian, Wusuo Zhongguo: Zhong-
guo dalu kongzhi meiti celüe da jiemi (Locked-in China: Exposing mainland China’s strategies for
controlling the media), Taiwan, Liming chuban gongsi, 2006. Published in English as The Fog of
Censorship: Media Control in China, Human Rights in China, 2008, www.hrichina.org/content/4050
(consulted on 20 August 2012).
13. For the role of the media in the Sun Zhigang incident, see Philip P. Pan, Out of Mao’s Shadow: The
Struggle for the Soul of a New China, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2008, chapter 9.
14. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial
Theory,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 82, no. 6, May 1977, pp. 1212-1241.
15. Xu Youyu, “Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai Zhongguo” (Liberalism and modern China), in Li Shitao (ed.),
Zhishifenzi lichang: Ziyouzhuyi zhi zheng yu Zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua (The intellectual
standpoint: The fight for liberalism and splits in China’s intellectual circles), Shidai wenyi chuban-
she, January 2000, pp. 412-430.
16. Teng Biao, “Zhongguo weiquan yundong wang hechu qu” (What next for China’s rights defence
movement?), Ren Yu Renquan, October 2006.
17. Progressive relative deprivation: the “substantial and simultaneous increase in expectations and
decrease in capabilities.” See James Chowning Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American
Sociological Review, vol. 27, 1962, pp. 5-19.
18. Website of the Tiananmen Mothers, a group of family members of victims of the official crack-
down on the 1989 Democracy Movement, www.tiananmenmother.org/index_files/Page379.htm
(consulted on 20 August 2012).
19. For more on the open letters movement, see Teng Biao, “Cong shangshu dao gongkaixin” (From
petitioning to open letters), Beijing Spring, October 2005.
20. Teng Biao, “Gongmin weiquan yu shehui zhuanxing” (Popular rights defence and social transfor-
mation), HRIC Biweekly, 4 July, 2010.
21. Regarding the co-evolution of the Internet and civil society, see Guobin Yang, “The co-evolution of
the Internet and civil society in China,” Asian Survey, vol. 43, no. 3, May-June 2003, pp. 405-422.
Special feature
formally joined the Worldwide Web in 1994, and by the end of 1996, there
were 200,000 Internet users in China. The rights defence movement’s signal
year, 2003, was also known as the year of “Internet discussion” as China’s
netizens became aware of their power to change the course of events
through the Internet. (22) The statistics at the end of 2003 were: 79,500,000
netizens in China; 30,890,000 computers connected to the Internet; and
596,000 websites with a .cn registration. The number of people online at
the end of 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 reached 94 million, 137 million, 298
million, and 457 million, respectively. As of the end of June 2012, 539 million
Chinese were online, with the Internet accessible to 39.9 percent of the
population, and 388 million Chinese accessed the Internet through cell
phones, for the first time exceeding the number using computers, 380 mil-
lion. The number of people with immediate communication access has
reached 445 million, and 251 million Chinese access social media websites.
China’s netizens spend an average of 19.9 hours online every week. (23)
The “Web 2.0” concept that emerged in 2004 quickly spread to China.
Characterised by user sharing, information gathering, the assembling of so-
cial groups around points of interest, and user-to-user interaction, it has
turned Internet users from browsers to creators of online content. Web 2.0
products include Skype, Twitter, Wiki, Facebook, Youtube, Flickr, QQ, MSN,
Renren, and microblogs, among others. (24) The interactive nature of Web 2.0
and its rapid transmission and transparency of information, supported by
the simultaneous development of cellular phones and other such technolo-
gies, greatly facilitated the organisation of social movements. In this way,
Web 2.0 changed the face of social movements and became an effective
tool for promoting democracy on the global scale.
In March 2006, Twitter burst onto the scene, pulling everyone into the
world of microblogs (weibo). Twitter was imitated by Chinese enterprises,
with the May 2007 establishment of Twitter clone Fanfou launching China’s
weibo era. Other clones called Jiwai, Zuosha (“Wassup?”), and Tencent fol-
lowed in close succession. Another large batch of microblogging sites, in-
cluding Digu, Jishike, Fexion, 9991 Microblog, Tongxue, and Follow5, went
online in 2009. The Sina microblog website went live in August 2009 and
quickly became China’s most influential microblogging site. With the es-
tablishment of aggregate gateway microblogs (t.163, Tencent, and Sohu mi-
croblogs going online in January, March, and April 2010 respectively), vertical
gateway microblogs, news microblogs, e-commerce microblogs, SNS mi-
croblogs, and independent microblog websites, China formally entered the
weibo era. (25)
Technical features made it impossible for the Chinese government to di-
rectly delete Twitter feeds. This made Twitter enormously effective for re-
porting sudden hotspot events and sensitive incidents, and inevitably
attracted large numbers of rights defenders, citizen journalists, independent
writers, and liberal-minded netizens. The day after the July 5 disturbances
in Urumqi in 2009, Twitter was blocked off. (Facebook was blocked on July
7.) Even so, some Chinese account-holders accessed Twitter through various
methods such as API proxies Twip and Tweetr, third-party platforms or soft-
ware such as Dabr and Twitese, or firewall-circumventing proxies such as
Freegate, Ultrasurf, or VPN. (26) Although only a small number of people ac-
tively use Twitter in China, it is widely used by rights defence lawyers, citizen
journalists, and other activists determined to preserve their freedom of ex-
pression. Some Twitter users encourage others to register and use mi-
croblogs inside China, because these have more traffic. Other Twitter users
promote proxies and Twitter, because these platforms provide access to
large amounts of information that is censored in China.
China’s microblog and cellular telephone usage has developed at lightning
speed. As of the end of March 2012, the Tencent, Sina, and t.163 microblogs
had 425 million, 324 million, and 120 million registered users respectively. (27)
By May 2012, Sina microblogs sent out an average of more than 100 million
content items per day, with average online access of around 60 minutes. (28)
At the end of February 2012, China had 1.007 billion cell phone users,
among whom 3G account-holders numbered 144 million and rising. (29) As
of the end of June 2012, people blogging from their cell phones numbered
170 million, with a usage rate of 43.8 percent among people who access
the Internet through their cell phones. (30) “The combined use of microblogs
and cell phones is an extension of online interactive behaviour that allows
netizens to maintain a shifting linearity. More crucially, microblog users can
draw on cell phone media to become spot news reporters, indirectly and
rapidly reporting events as they happen.” (31)
Individual rights defence: In the courtroom
and on the Internet
The typical work of rights defence lawyers is advocacy. Gaining familiarity
with the law, investigating evidence, and fighting for the rights of litigants
have therefore become the fundamental tasks of rights defence work. This
alone does not constitute a rights defence movement, however. The greatest
problem of China’s judicial system is that the judiciary is not independent
and there is no effective supervision of the unlawful activities of public se-
curity organs, procuratorates, and courts. In almost all human rights cases,
“judges don’t pass judgment, and those who pass judgment don’t appear
at trial”; trials are mere window-dressing, and the actual power to adjudicate
lies outside of the courtroom. Due to the central-regional government dy-
namic in China’s post-totalitarian system, the desire of local officials to min-
imise unrest during the current emphasis on stability preservation, (32)and
public opinion becoming a consideration in the handling of crises or sensi-
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22. Hu Yong, Zhongsheng xuanhua: Wangluo shidai de geren biaoda yu gonggong taolun (Mass uproar:
Personal expression and public discussion in the Internet age), Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe,
2008, pp. 307-308.
23. See the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC)’s annual “Statistical Reports on the
Internet Development in China,” www1.cnnic.cn/en/index/0O/index.htm (consulted on 20 August
2012).
24. See the Wikipedia entries on Web 2.0, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0 and http://zh.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0 (links consulted on 20 August 2012).
25. Yan Deli, “Woguo weibo de fazhan licheng he fazhan qushi fenxi” (An analysis of the development
process and development trends of China’s microblogs), http://news.iresearch.cn/0468/
20101130/128679.shtml (consulted on 20 August 2012).
26. See the Wikipedia entry on Twitter, http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter; see also Chang Ping, “Twit-
ter zai Zhongguo” (Twitter in China), Financial Times online Chinese edition, 11 January 2010,
www.ftchinese.com/story/001030710 (links consulted on 20 August 2012).
27. “Wangyi weibo zhuce yonghu shupo yi cheng disan da weibo” (T.163 microblog registered users
break 100 million to become the third largest microblog), http://tech.163.com/12/0517/
10/81MTH5K5000915BF.html (consulted on 20 August 2012).
28. “Xinlang weibo yonghushu chao 3 yi banshu yonghu yidong zhongduan denglu” (Sina weibo ac-
counts exceed 300 million, half of account holders shift terminal registration), Xinjingbao, 16 May
2012, http://tech.ifeng.com/internet/detail_2012_05/16/14546599_0.shtml (consulted on 20
August 2012).
29. “2012 nian 2 yue Zhongguo 3G yonghu guimo yi da 1.4 yi” (In February 2012, China 3G account-
holders reach 140 million), http://tech.ifeng.com/internet/date/detail_2012_04/11/
13804950_0.shtml (consulted on 20 August 2012).
30. CNNIC, “Di 30 ci Zhongguo hulian wangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao” (30th statistical
report on the development of China’s Internet), July 2012.
31. Yan Deli, op. cit.
32. For a report on the “stability preservation apparatus” and a “China stability preservation organi-
zation chart,” see “Weiwen tizhi” (The stability preservation apparatus), Caijing online, 7 June
2011, www.caijing.com.cn/2011-06-07/110738832_1.html (consulted on 20 August 2012).
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tive incidents, rights defenders try to use the media to influence the judicial
outcomes of certain cases. (33) Given the lack of judicial and media inde-
pendence, a very complex relationship has emerged between the judiciary
and popular will. Regarding certain hot-button issues, rights defenders have
used the Internet to exert the pressure of public opinion in a way that has
increased the cost of judicial injustice. Without constant public monitoring
and efforts through the Internet, some cases would end up with defendants
being framed, or with the judiciary acting in a peremptory or evasive man-
ner. Concern over individual cases; open letters, petitions, and Internet post-
ings; and rights defence actions by lawyers, journalists, and intellectuals
have combined to give rise to an increasingly law-conscious and public-
spirited populace. (34) Liu Xiaobo believes that non-violent rights defence
campaigns “put freedom into practice through the use of enlightened
thought, expression, and rights defence activities in the details of daily life;
and especially through the sustained accumulation of individual rights de-
fence cases, they build up a sense of morality and justice, organisational re-
sources, and tactical experience among the people.” (35)
Trainee lawyer Wang Daogang was detained over the matter of a 3,000
yuan lawyer’s fee. In March 2012, lawyer Cheng Hai posted the indictment
and defence statements for the case on a microblog. Once the prosecution
learned of this, it posted its own “factual basis” and “legal basis” on the In-
ternet. After studying the case, some lawyers felt that Wang’s action did
not constitute a crime but only a disciplinary infraction, and they suggested
that a professional grudge might be behind the case. Lawyer Liu Yang then
took the lead in publishing online an “Urgent Appeal Demanding that the
Haidian District People’s Court Declare Trainee Lawyer Wang Daogang Not
Guilty,” which was signed by 118 lawyers. Soon afterward, the procuratorate
withdrew the charges. (36) This case is an example of how once a case be-
comes public on the Internet and brings pressure to bear, officials are com-
pelled to respond in some way, and sometimes will compromise.
Following the Sun Zhigang case, public attention on the Internet has re-
sulted in changes to some decisions. For example, in the cases of Sun Dawu,
Deng Yujiao, (37) Cui Yingjie, (38) Xu Ting, (39) the Chongqing Nail House, (40) Li
Zhuang, (41) Guo Baofeng, Wu Ying, (42) and the “five Guangzhou gentlemen
holding placards,” (43) it can be said with certainty that without the attention
brought to the cases on the Internet, the fates of the persons concerned
would have been quite different. Rights defence in these cases led to the
emergence of some enthusiastic and appealing human rights lawyers, as
well as many outstanding grass roots rights defence activists and citizen
journalists. In addition, interaction with members of the public and constant
contact and collaboration gave rise to an informal circle of rights defenders
and increased organisational abilities in rights defence campaigns. The note-
worthy “legal team” phenomenon emerged and became apparent against
this background. The development of the Internet, in particular the social
media, greatly accelerated the emergence of teamwork by lawyers.
The cases of Cai Zhuohua, (44) Dongyang’s Huashui Village, (45) the Three
Grades of Servants church, (46) Taishi Village, (47) Chen Guangcheng, Wang Bo
(a case of religious freedom for Falun Gong), and the melamine-tainted milk
powder scandal all involved collective participation by multiple lawyers. In
early 2007, a coalition of Christian rights defence lawyers was established.
Once microblogs became an important medium for communication, link-
ups, cooperation, and the development of collective action among lawyers
became even easier and more cost-effective. Guangdong-based Southern
Exposure magazine perceptively noted the social significance of these legal
teams, and referred to 2011 as the year of collective legal action: “If it is
said that the legal teams in the Li Zhuang case and Beihai case were exam-
ples of a professional community pulling together, then the legal teams in
the subsequent Suzhou ‘Changshu six youths’ case and Guizhou ‘Li Qing-
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33. For the relationship between the rights defence movement and the media, and the media strate-
gies employed, see Teng Biao, “Gongmin weiquan yu shehui zhuangxing” (Popular rights defence
and social transformation), HRIC Biweekly, 4 July 2010.
34. See Teng Biao, “Jingcheng tuwei: Shifa yu minyi” (Breaking out of encirclement), Tongzhou gongjin
(In the same boat), no. 7, 2008. For a general discussion of the media and China’s judiciary, see
Benjamin L. Liebman, “Watchdog or demagogue? The media in the Chinese legal system,” Co-
lumbia Law Review, vol. 105, no. 1, 2005, pp. 1-157.
35. Liu Xiaobo, “Tongguo gaibian shehui lai gaibian zhengquan” (Changing the government by chang-
ing society), in Liu Xiaobo, Zhuixun ziyou (The pursuit of freedom), Laogai Research Foundation,
2011, p. 340.
36. Liu Yang, “Lianhe juji, yaxu shi gaibian Zhongguo lüshi mingyun youxiao shouduan” (United attack
may be an effective strategy for changing the fate of China’s lawyers), 17 March 2012,
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_63aeaff70102e0ol.html (consulted on 20 August 2012).
37. On 10 May 2009, three government officials in Sanming Township, Hubei Province, attempted to
sexually assault manicurist Deng Yujiao. Deng defended herself with her manicuring shears, wound-
ing two of the officials, one of them fatally. After Deng was arrested, public support for her bur-
geoned on the Internet. In June 2009, the court delivered a verdict of no criminal penalty against
Deng.
38. On 11 August 2006, a Haidian urban management official named Li Zhiqiang and his colleague
confiscated the cart of peddler Cui Yingjie. During the ensuing scuffle, Cui stabbed Li to death. In
April 2007, Cui was handed a suspended death sentence.
39. On 21 April 2006, Xu Ting and his friend Guo Anshan took advantage of a malfunctioning ATM to
withdraw 175,000 yuan and 18,000 yuan, respectively. In December 2007, Xu was sentenced to
life imprisonment. When this information became public, the pressure of public opinion led to a
retrial, and in February 2008, Xu’s sentence was lowered to five years in prison.
40. Redevelopment of Chongqing’s Hexinglu District began in 2004, but householders Yang Wu and
Wu Ping refused to be relocated. The developer began foundation excavation around their home,
with the result that the house stood out like a nail on an island of earth. The incident drew all the
more attention because it occurred during the annual sessions of the National People’s Congress
and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
41. On 9 February 2010, Li Zhuang, a lawyer for one of the defendants in the Chongqing organised
crime crackdown, was convicted by the Chongqing Intermediate Court of fabricating evidence
and impairing testimony, and was sentenced to one year and six months in prison. Upon com-
pleting his prison term, Li was indicted once again for “crimes of omission” and was escorted to
the procuratorate for examination. After strong protests from lawyers, scholars, and others, the
procuratorate withdrew the charges after the trial commenced.
42. In January 2012, a private entrepreneur, Wu Ying, was sentenced to death for fraud by the Zhejiang
Provincial High Court. After the case raised enormous public concern, the Supreme Court sent the
case back for retrial, and on 21 May of the same year, Wu Ying was handed a suspended death
sentence.
43. On 30 March 2012, a dozen Guangzhou-based democracy and rights defence activists held up
placards in Guangzhou’s pedestrian walkways demanding that the government push forward po-
litical reform. Five of them, Ou Ronggui, Xiao Yong, Huang Wenxun, Yang Chong, and Luo Shouheng,
were subsequently placed in criminal detention for “unlawful assembly, demonstration, and
protest.” All five were released after support for them was raised on the Internet.
44. In 2005, Cai Zhuohua, an evangelist at a Beijing house church, was arrested for printing Bibles to
distribute to Christians in impoverished regions. More than a year later, he was sentenced to three
years in prison for “operating an illegal business,” and his wife likewise received a two-year prison
sentence.
45. Translator’s note (hereafter TN): In April 2005, thousands of public security and other personnel
clashed with tens of thousands of villagers in Huashui Township of Dongyang City, Zhejiang
Province, over pollution caused by local chemical plants. See “Ceng bei fengsha de ‘Dongyang
Huashui shijian’ zhenxiang ji guanfang baodao” (The truth and the official version of the blacked-
out “Dongyang Huashui incident”), Lubansheng Random Thoughts blog, www.9ask.cn/blog/user/
lubangsheng/archives/2006/11448.html (consulted on 20 August 2012); and “Large Scale Riot
Erupts in Huashui Town of Zhejiang Province,” The Epoch Times, 15 April 2005.
46. TN: Members of the Three Grades of Servants church were put on trial in 2006, with three sen-
tenced to death, three others sentenced to life in prison, and 11 others sentenced from three to
15 years in prison in connection with the murders of several members of the rival Oriental Light-
ning sect. See Reuters, “Three Grades of Servants: China sentences sect members to death for
murders,” 7 July 2006, posted on the Religion News Blog, www.religionnewsblog.com/15192/
three-grades-of-servants-china-sentences-sect-members-to-death-for-murders (consulted on 20
August 2012); and China Aid Association, “Urgent Appeal regarding the Church Case of the ‘Three
Grades of Servants’ by Preachers from the House Churches of China,” 17 March 2006, www.chi-
naaid.org/2006/03/urgent-appeal-regarding-church-case-of.html (consulted on 20 August 2012).
47. In July 2005, residents of Taishi Village in Panyu, Guangdong Province, repeatedly demanded the
recall of the village head over payments for reclaimed land and other issues. When several villagers
and their legal advisors were detained, a large number of rights defence lawyers became concerned
and offered legal advice in support. The incident attracted considerable media coverage both
inside China and overseas.
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hong mafia case’ demonstrated the extension of common cause-type legal
teams to other kinds of cases.” (48) In the example of the Guizhou Li Qing-
hong mafia case, more than 100 lawyers were involved at various times,
and a good portion of them were lawyers who enjoyed considerable influ-
ence through their microblogs. Lawyers used microblogs to post news about
the case, to accuse prosecutors and judges of procedural violations, to ex-
pose the extortion of confessions from their clients through torture, to ex-
pose how their clients had been intimidated into dismissing legal counsel,
to post open petition letters, and to appeal for other lawyers to join in. Apart
from defence lawyers, some other lawyers and scholars came forward to
attend the trial, or to investigate or lend moral support, and many netizens
followed, discussed, and forwarded the postings, maintaining sustained In-
ternet traffic on an unprecedented scale.
The “surrounding gaze”: The Internet and
rights defence outside the courtroom
Apart from teaming up on cases, rights defence activists committed to
the concept of rule of law attempt to promote it at an even deeper level. In
this connection, the term weiguan (围观) has recently appeared. The Uni-
versity of Hong Kong’s China Media Project has coined the English transla-
tion “surrounding gaze,” with the following explanation: “The ‘surrounding
gaze’ is the notion, rooted in modern Chinese literature and culture, of
crowds of people gathering around some kind of public spectacle. […] The
term can now point to the social and political possibilities of new commu-
nications technologies, such as the Internet and the microblog, which might,
say some, promote change by gathering public opinion around certain issues
and events. The term weiguan can refer to the larger phenomenon of the
‘surrounding gaze,’ including its pejorative sense, but also often refers to its
positive or potential dimension as concentrated public opinion. The term
‘online surrounding gaze,’ or wangluo weiguan, is also commonly used
today.” (49) This section will discuss various aspects of the “surrounding gaze.”
Challenging “evil laws”
Apart from defending their clients’ rights in cases, rights defence lawyers
also employ various means to promote change in the legal system. The Sun
Zhigang case led to the abolition of the Custody and Repatriation system.
After Du Daobin was arrested in 2003, more than 100 intellectuals and
rights defenders in China issued an “Appeal Demanding a Legal Explanation
of the ‘Crime of Inciting Subversion.’” Legal practitioners used various means
to collectively appeal for abolition of the Re-education Through Labour sys-
tem. For example, in November 2007, Mao Yushi, He Weifang, and others
(most of them legal practitioners) jointly signed a “Citizens’ Proposal to
Launch an Investigation into Violations of the Constitution and to Abolish
the Re-education Through Labour System.” (50) In the defence statement for
the 2007 Wang Bo case, defence counsel openly challenged each of the
laws and judicial interpretations that penalised practitioners of Falun
Gong. (51) In 2010, lawyer Yang Jinzhu prepared to collect signatures from
10,000 lawyers for a proposal that the Supreme People’s Court issue a ju-
dicial interpretation of Article 306 of the Criminal Law (the crime of perjury
by lawyers), but was halted by the Hunan judiciary. (52) There have also been
many campaigns by activists demanding abolition of China’s family plan-
ning policies. While the National People’s Congress was discussing the draft
amended Criminal Procedure Law in 2012, members of the public expressed
particular concern regarding some provisions that were contrary to the spirit
of rule of law, and many rights defenders called for an end to “evil laws” (e
fa 恶法). (53)
Promoting direct elections in lawyers’ associations
China does not have an autonomous legal profession; lawyers’ associations
at all levels are puppets of the justice bureaus, lacking democratic elections
and transparency in their policy-making. In 2004, Liu Zilong and other
lawyers pushed for a recall of the president and secretary general of the
Shenzhen Lawyers’ Association, (54) an incident that was echoed by Beijing’s
legal professionals a few years later. On 26 August 2008, Cheng Hai, Tang
Jitian, and more than 30 other Beijing lawyers posted on the Internet “An
Appeal to All Beijing Lawyers, the Municipal Justice Bureau, and Municipal
Lawyers’ Association: Conform with the Tide of History and Achieve Direct
Elections to Lawyers’ Association,” which called for direct elections to the
Lawyers’ Association, and also solicited the views of fellow professionals re-
garding their draft “Electoral Procedures for the Beijing Lawyers’ Associa-
tion.” These lawyers used methods such as text messaging, email, regular
meetings, and personal visits to legal offices to appeal for the support of
other lawyers and to canvass for votes in the election. The Beijing Lawyers’
Association then issued a “Stern Statement” warning, “Anyone who, on the
pretext of promoting democratic elections, uses text messaging, the Inter-
net, and other such media to covertly establish contact, publish seditious
comments, stir up rumours, and engage in rabble-rousing among Beijing’s
lawyers in an attempt to win support among the ill-informed for so-called
‘direct elections to the Beijing Lawyers’ Association,’ is violating the law.” (55)
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48. Ye Zhucheng, “Lüshituan: Fazhi liliang de jueqi” (Legal teams: The rising power of rule of law), Nan-
feng Chuang (Southern Exposure), 31 December 2011. TN: For an excellent English summary of
the Li Qinghong case and its implications, see Yueran Zhang, “China’s All-Star Legal Team Pleads
for Defendants’ Rights On Social Media,” Tea Leaf Nation, 25 July 2012,
http://tealeafnation.com/2012/07/bilingual-brew-chinas-all-star-legal-team-pleads-for-defen-
dants-rights-on-social-media (accessed 28 August 2012).
49. TN: “The Surrounding Gaze,” Media Dictionary, The China Media Project, http://cmp.hku.hk/
2011/01/04/9399 (consulted on 20 August 2012).
50. “Guangyu qidong weixian shencha chengxu, feichu laodong jiaoyang zhidu de gongmin jianyishu”
(Citizens’ proposals to launch an investigation into violations of the constitution and to abolish
the Re-education Through Labour System), www.ccwlawyer.com/center.asp?idd=1293 (consulted
on 20 August 2012). For examples of opposing the RTL system in specific cases, see Teng Biao,
“Shei lai chengdan dizhi efa de zeren” (Who will take responsibility for boycotting evil laws?),
HRIC Biweekly, no. 41, 16 December 2010; Si Weijiang, “Fang Hong su Chongqing shi laojiaowei
yituo shibei laojiao an daili ci” (Legal counsel’s statement in Fang Hong’s lawsuit against the
Chongqing Municipal RTL Committee), www.niwota.com/submsg/10342725 (consulted on 20
August 2012); and regarding the 2012 appeal following the conviction that year of Tang Hui (a
petitioner seeking justice for her raped daughter who was sent to a labour camp) in Hunan: ‘Shi
lüshi jianyan sifabu gong’anbu tiaozheng laojiao zhidu (Ten lawyers submit suggestions to the
Ministries of Justice and Public Security to adjust the Re-education Through Labour system).
51. Li Heping, Teng Biao, et al., “The Supremacy of the Constitution, and Freedom of Religion” (Stacy
Mosher, trans.), in Stacy Mosher and Patrick Poon (ed.), A Sword and a Shield: China’s Human
Rights Lawyers, Hong Kong, China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, February 2011.
52. See “Yangsi daofa” (Yang’s swordsmanship), Southern Metropolitan Weekly (Nandu Zhoukan), 11
June 2011, www.nbweekly.com/news/special/201106/26344.aspx (consulted on 20 August 2012).
53. Beifeng posted an online appeal for a “Campaign of all Chinese to halt evil laws,” and provided a
list of all NPC delegates, calling on netizens to telephone delegates or send them email and text
messages stating “The amended Criminal Procedure Law is an evil law and must on no account
be passed.” Mai Yanting, “Minjian qishen fankang xingsufa, lizu ‘beishizong’ hefahua” (Public rises
in opposition to Criminal Procedure Law, forcefully resists legalisation of “disappearing”), RFI,
http://www.chinese.rfi.fr/node/108060 (consulted on 20 August 2012).
54. “Shenzhen lüxie huizhang bamian shijian zhixuan huizhang de ‘18 zongzui’” (“18 crimes” in direct
elections in the recall incident for the president of the Shenzhen Lawyers’ Association), 21 shiji
jingji baodao, 4 August 2004.
55. Zhou Hua, “Beijing lüshi xiehui zhixuan fengbo” (Controversy over direct elections to the Beijing
Lawyers’ Association), Southern Exposure, 14 October 2008.
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This statement provoked a negative response in the legal profession. Although
the effort to promote democracy in the Lawyers’ Association was not suc-
cessful, it had enormous influence and considerable historical significance. (56)
There are indications that the suspension of licenses and non-renewal of reg-
istration of some lawyers (such as Yang Huiwen, Wen Haibo, Chang Lihui, Tang
Jitian, Tong Chaoping, and Jiang Tianyong) over the following two years was
retaliation by the Justice Bureau and the Beijing Lawyers’ Association.
Activating the Constitution
In May 2003, He Weifang, Xiao Han, and three other scholars sent a letter
to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress requesting a
special investigation into implementation of the Custody & Repatriation sys-
tem since the death of Sun Zhigang. This was an attempt to activate the
long-dormant Article 71 (1) of the PRC Constitution, which states: “The Na-
tional People’s Congress and its Standing Committee may, when they deem
it necessary, appoint committees of inquiry into specific questions and adopt
relevant resolutions in the light of their reports.” Requesting that the gov-
ernment disclose certain information in accordance with the “Regulation on
the Disclosure of Government Information” is another typical example of at-
tempting to activate existing laws in order to promote systemic change. In
2009, Beijing lawyer Yang Huiwen filed a request for information with all 73
departments under the Beijing municipal government, requiring disclosure
of “the specifics of official vehicle use, reception of guests with public funds,
and the financial administration of public funds leaving China; the circum-
stances of execution of the annual budget, departmental budget data, and
policy-making processes,” etc., but received only two complete replies. (57)
Strolling and “surrounding gaze”
The 2007 Xiamen PX incident (58) took on symbolic significance by endow-
ing the term “strolling” with a completely new connotation. A series of sub-
sequent public incidents (the Three Fujianese Netizens, the Yihuang
demolition and removal, (59) the Zhao Lianhai case, (60) the Panyu refuse in-
cinerator, (61) etc.) likewise brought the phrase weiguan – “surrounding gaze”
– to the fore. In the writings of Lu Xun, weiguan has a bleak and negative
connotation. “However, the citizens’ weiguan spurred by microblogs has
clearly redefined the term, making it a synonym for active participation.
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56. For an assessment of this incident, see Jerome A. Cohen, “The Struggle for Autonomy of Beijing’s
Public Interest Lawyers,” China Rights Forum, no. 1, 2009, www.hrichina.org/crf/article/3692 (con-
sulted on 20 August 2012).
57. Huang Xiuli, “Yici youguan xinxi gongkai de ‘xingwei yishu’” (A “performance art” incident regarding
open information), Southern Metropolitan Weekly, 20 May 2009.
58. TN: Text messaging mobilized thousands of residents in a street protest opposing construction of
a $1.5 billion a xylene (PX) plant in Xiamen, Fujian province. For an analysis of the incident, see
Li Datong, “Xiamen: The triumph of public will?”, Open Democracy, 16 January 2008, www.open-
democracy.net/article/xiamen_the_triumph_of_public_will (consulted on 20 August 2012), and
“The Xiamen PX Project,” EastSouthWestNorth, 1 June 2007, http://zonaeuropa.com/
20070601_1.htm (consulted on 20 August 2012).
59. On 10 September 2010, three people were critically injured in a self-immolation incident triggered
by a forced demolition and relocation in Fenggang Township, Yihuang County, Jiangxi Province.
One of those injured, Ye Zhongcheng, subsequently died of his injuries.
60. Zhao Lianhai set up a website, “Kidney Stone Babies,”dedicated to victims of the 2008 melamine-tainted
milk powder scandal, through which he carried out investigations, published news, and called for the
parents of affected infants to join together in a rights defence lawsuit. In November 2010, Beijing’s
Daxing Court sentenced Zhao to two-and-a-half years in prison for the crime of “stirring up trouble.”
61. In 2009, the Guangzhou municipal government decided to build a power plant fuelled by the in-
cineration of domestic waste at a location in the Panyu District, with operation scheduled to
commence in 2010. In October 2009, hundreds of landholders in the locality of Dashi launched
a protest against the plant.
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Demonstrators gathering for a weiguan protest action on the day of the trial of internet activist You Jingyou for defamation in the
context of the “Three Netizens of Fujian” case, Fuzhou (Fujian Province), 16 April 2010 (the other two “Fujian netizens” were Wu
Huaying and Fan Yanqiong). The banner displayed here –quoting Premier Wen Jiabao– reads “Fairness and justice outshine the sun.”
Wang Lihong, the woman on the left, was later convicted of “creating a disturbance” for her participation in this action. © He Yang
The arrival of the microblog marks an epoch during which weiguan has been
elevated to a new historic height.” (62)
The Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmeng) and Dr. Xu Zhiyong have
long been concerned with the rights of petitioners, and repeatedly organised
weiguan events at so-called “black prisons,” (63) on a number of occasions
bringing about the rescue of some petitioners. This kind of “surrounding
gaze” uses the Internet to organise citizen volunteers and devise tactical
strategies, while coordinating online and offline activities through mi-
croblogs and Twitter. (64) On 16 June 2010, the day of the Dragon Boat Fes-
tival, netizens organised a “summer evening party” in support of rights
defender Ni Yulan. When the police detained Ni Yulan, netizens set up tents
at the entrance to the detention centre in protest, and when the police
drove them off, they took to the streets.
The case of the Three Fujianese Netizens (65) added another thick dossier
to the history of weiguan. When the trial opened at the Mawei District Peo-
ple’s Court on 16 April 2010, hundreds of netizens from all over China sent
out messages of support at a pre-arranged time and reported on the situ-
ation through Twitter. Although many participated in the weiguan event,
they created a moving spectacle of peace, restraint, and order, and left be-
hind a series of essays, videos, and analyses that captured the attention of
observers. Commentators noted, “The Fujian weiguan incident did not arise
spontaneously out of thin air, but in fact was the inevitable result of the
development of China’s civil society over the course of several years.” (66)
“This mass weiguan was the culmination of years of struggle, and it will
continue; it is completely different from the Xiamen PX incident and has
greater value and significance.” (67) One important difference is that the focus
of this “surrounding gaze” was the freedom of expression guaranteed in the
Constitution, rather than personal interests or an environmental issue.
NGOs
Many rights defence activities require a great deal of day-to-day, trivial
work; they require the coordinated action and substantial human and
financial resources that only a non-governmental organisation (NGO)
can provide. For example, there is the Aizhixing Institute, which focuses
on AIDS and public health; the Shenzhen Equity & Justice Initiative,
which focuses on involuntary psychiatric treatment; the Beijing Yiren-
ping Centre, which focuses on equal rights; the Transition Institute
(Zhuanzhixing), which focuses on professional monopolies, tax reform,
and research on social transformation; the Open Constitution Initiative
(Gongmeng 公盟), which focuses on human rights and rule of law; and
the Beijing-based China Against Death Penalty, which focuses on the
death penalty. NGOs focusing on rights defence activities, whether re-
lating to environmental protection, workers’ rights, or the rights of peo-
ple living with HIV-AIDS, have difficulty registering with the Ministry of
Civil Affairs, and can only register with ministries in charge of industry
or commerce. Some are not able to register at all, and can only exist as
operational networks: for example Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch
(Minsheng guangcha gongzuoshi 民生观察工作室) and China Against
Death Penalty. Some were registered as companies but then had their
registration cancelled, such as the Open Constitution Initiative. Gong-
meng’s participation in the rights defence movement was quite wide-
ranging, focusing on petitioners’ rights, public interest litigation, civic
participation and grassroots elections, lawyers’ rights, freedom of ex-
pression, tainted milk powder and other public health incidents, promot-
ing reform to the household registration (hukou) system, and demanding
equal access to education, among other issues.
Independent candidates in people’s congress
elections
According to The Electoral Law of the PRC, direct elections to the various
levels of people’s congresses occur nominally up to the county level. Even
county-level people’s congress elections are manipulated and are sham
democracy. However, some individuals such as Yao Lifa and Xu Zhiyong have
managed to exert influence as independent candidates in county people’s
congress elections. (68) Microblogs were very influential during the 2011 peo-
ple’s congress elections, with many rights defenders, lawyers, writers, and
teachers using microblogs to announce their candidacy, and carrying out
campaigns and publicity through microblogs, blogs, public speeches, leaflet-
ing, visits and other methods. Because the government exerted pressure
through various types of covert manipulation and overt unlawful acts, only
a tiny minority of independent candidates were ultimately elected, but their
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62. Xiao Shu, “Gongmin weiguan: Laizi putongren de jianjin geming” (Citizen’s surrounding gaze: The
product of gradual revolution among the ordinary people), Shidai zhoukan, no. 106, 25 November
2010. For an earlier article that brought out the surrounding gaze’s significance to social move-
ments, see Xiao Shu, “Guangzhu jiushi liliang: Weiguan gaibian Zhongguo” (Attention is power:
The surrounding gaze changes China), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), 13 January 2010.
63. On black prisons, see Human Rights Watch, “An Alleyway in Hell: China’s Abusive ‘Black Jails,’”
November 2009, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china1109webwcover_1.pdf (consulted
on 20 August 2012).
64. For a comprehensive record of one weiguan operation at a black prison, see Teng Biao, “Gongmin
zai xingdong” (Citizens in action), Gongmin yuekan, January 2009.
65. Three Fujian netizens, You Jingyou, Fan Yanqiong, and Wu Huaying, posted comments on the In-
ternet regarding the Yan Xiaoling case, and apart from seeking redress for injustice, suggested that
the Minqing police were shielding a criminal gang. The Mawei procuratorate charged the three
with framing the police. After three hearings, the court found the three netizens guilty of slander.
Throughout the trial, netizens converged on Fujian in a show of support and sustained interest in
the case through postings on the Internet.
66. Wang Debang, “Qushahua, qi liangzhi: Fuzhou ‘san wangmin an’ weiguan shijian qianxi” (Exercising
conscience: A superficial analysis of the ‘Three Fujianese Netizens’ surrounding gaze incident),
Minzhu Zhongguo, 8 May 2010.
67. Wang Ze, “‘Weiguan’ chuangzao lishi: 4.6 qinlizhe de zishu” (The surrounding gaze creates history:
An account by a 16 April [2010] participant), HRIC Biweekly, 6 May 2010.
68. Zhang Jianfeng, “Duli renda daibiao shi nian fuchen” (The ebb and tide of independent people’s
congress delegates), Southern Exposure, no. 16, 2009.
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A demonstrator holds up a banner reading “Light, Truth,
Justice,” “Justice is a human longing,” and (in smaller script),
“Pay attention to the Case of the Three Fujian Netizens.
16 April [2010].”
© He Yang
campaigning activities still had historical significance by displaying the
power of ordinary citizens. (69)
Recall movements
In April 2003, nearly 10,000 villagers from several towns under the juris-
diction of Fujian’s Fu’an City signed a joint petition demanding the recall of
Fu’an’s mayor. This was the first recall petition for a mayor since 1949, and
it was soon followed by similar petitions in Fujian’s Minhou County and
Fuzhou City, and Hebei’s Tangshan City and Qinhuangdao City, where rep-
resentatives of tens of thousands of farmers who had lost their land
launched campaigns demanding that local Party and government adminis-
trators be removed from office and deprived of their qualifications as peo-
ple’s congress delegates. (70) The Taishi Village incident in 2005 was even
more influential. (71) Right defenders with special legal expertise played crit-
ical roles in several recall campaigns, among them Li Boguang (aka Li
Baiguang), Guo Feixiong, Tang Jingling, Lü Banglie, Zhao Yan, and Yu Meisun.
Compiling handbooks
Rights defence movements require constant summarisation of experience,
the provision of campaign guidebooks, and the promotion of theory to guide
practice. Some rights defenders and organisations have written and com-
piled practical handbooks: for example Yao Lifa’s Essential Knowledge for
China’s Independent Candidates in the 2011-2012 Elections, the Civil Rights
Handbook edited by Zhang Hui, the Transition Institute’s Citizen’s Guide to
Taxation, Xu Zhiyong’s Civil Rights Defence Handbook, the Citizen’s Guide
to Participating in People’s Congress Elections by Wei Huanhuan and Yao
Lifa, the Handbook Against Torture by Li Heping and other lawyers, and a
series of handbooks by Aizhixing aimed at people with AIDS, homosexuals,
and other groups.
Non-violent non-cooperation and civil disobedience
A typical example of “non-violent non-cooperation” was the “take back
the vote campaign” launched by Tang Jingling and others in 2006. The cam-
paign called for citizens to use various means of expressing their refusal to
participate or vote in elections as a boycott of manipulated and sham elec-
tions. This seems antithetical to independent participation in elections, but
its social significance achieves the same end through different means. (72)
Other examples of non-cooperation campaigns include joint statements
rejecting CCTV and other official media, (73) publicly refusing to subscribe to
official newspapers, refusing to provide service, (74) uninstalling software that
helps the government monitor and control information, refusing to use
Yahoo! email following the arrest of Shi Tao, (75) and refusing to join or an-
nouncing withdrawal from Party organisations, writer’s associations, and
other official organs.
Civil disobedience is when citizens follow their conscience by using non-
violent methods to openly defy laws, willingly bearing the consequences to
appeal to the public’s sense of justice. Theorists are divided over whether
or not civil disobedience is appropriate to non-democratic regimes. Although
it is hard to identify influential classic examples of civil disobedience in
China, (76) cases of a similar nature can be cited. One example is Christian
house churches refusing to register with the government and carrying out
worship activities in public. (77) Another example is Yang Zhizhu’s open vio-
lation of China’s family planning policies with an out-of-plan baby. (78) There
is also Beijing residents’ intentional violation of bans on setting off fire-
crackers during the Spring Festival, or lawyer Li Subin’s defiance of a ban on
driving cars with less-than-1.0-liter engine displacement along Chang’an
Avenue. (79)
There are many other types of rights defence, for instance sit-ins, relay
hunger strikes, labour strikes, carrying placards on streets, citizen investiga-
tion teams, lobbying for legislation and policies, satirical skits, street per-
formance art, creation and performance of songs, Internet boycotts, (80)
applications for demonstration permits, cartoons, graffiti, popular opinion
awards, debates, documentary films, (81) large-scale dinner parties, (82) etc.
Some more extreme methods include self-immolation, hunger strikes, self-
mutilation, self-confinement, and self-abasement, but because these are
36 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 2 / 3
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controversial and present particular difficulties, they have not been widely
used.
Online rights defence campaigns
As soon as the Internet entered China, ordinary citizens began using it to
fight for their rights. Huang Qi, who was imprisoned in 2000 after estab-
lishing the Tianwang website in 1999, launched numerous human rights ef-
forts through the Internet. From creating websites, discussion forums,
bulletin boards, and blogs to the use of Twitter and microblogs, rights de-
fenders have remained at the forefront of learning and using the latest net-
working technology, putting China on the road to technological
empowerment.
The interactivity, openness, grassroots appeal, and immediacy of Web2.0
technology have created new modes for social movements. Online social
movements can be multi-hubbed, random, boundary-straddling, and virtual.
Any given networking module, website, or web page can become the hub
of a campaign. A casually transmitted item of information can launch a col-
lective netizen movement. The initiator of a campaign can conceal his or
her true identity. At the same time, however, online social movements can
also be planned, normative (through fixed network positions), and localised,
and a great deal of information can be released through identifiable enti-
ties. (83) The abundance and diversity of online rights defence activities have
propelled both the breadth and depth of development of China’s rights de-
fence movement.
Online petitions
It used to be that the cost of organising open letters was very high, while
the channels for issuing them were narrow and the range of recipients very
limited. The Internet age has made the organisation of open letters much
more convenient, while also reducing the cost. Blogs, email, listservs, Skype,
qq, MSN, Twitter, and microblogs can all be used to organise and issue open
letters, and websites have been established specifically for signature cam-
paigns. Many open letters were issued during rescue efforts for Du Daobin,
with more than 1,600 signatures gathered in a short amount of time. It was
during the signature campaigns surrounding this incident that “there
emerged an unusual convergence of intellectuals from both within and out-
side the system.” (84) In the Gan Jinhua case, (85) 300 signatures were gathered,
including those of many lawyers and legal scholars. In the Wu Changlong
injustice case, (86) the first round of campaigning garnered 1,252 signatures.
Following the Li Wangyang incident, round after round of signature cam-
paigns proliferated, along with the creation of websites specifically for col-
lecting signatures and related articles and publicising the progress of the
campaign. (87) It can be anticipated that an increasing number of online sig-
nature campaigns will arise in response to specific cases or incidents.
Online rescue
On 16 July 2009, Twitter account holder Guo Baofeng (amoiist) was de-
tained by the Mawei police after disseminating information on a case of in-
justice through the Internet. While police officers were asleep, he issued a
rescue appeal through Twitter. This incited the indignation and sympathy
of his Twitter followers, who the next morning voiced their protest through
a relay tweet: “Guo Baofeng, your mother is calling you home for dinner!”
A posting with similar wording had just become a hot topic on Baidu’s World
of Warcraft (Moshou) discussion forum, and now became miraculously as-
sociated with Guo Baofeng’s personal circumstances. After that, news about
Guo was promptly published through Twitter, and followers immediately
launched offline rescue activities such as postcard mailing campaigns. On
31 July, Guo Baofeng was released. (88) The Chen Guangcheng, Ai Weiwei, and
Gongmeng-Xu Zhiyong cases also engendered impressive Internet rescue
campaigns involving massive quantities of articles, photos, postings, car-
toons, and videos on Twitter, microblogs, and Facebook.
“Emblem campaigns”
When Liu Xiaobo was on trial, many netizens launched “yellow ribbon
campaigns” by adding a yellow ribbon symbolising “thoughts and prayers
for your safe return” on their Twitter and microblog banners. Many members
of the public who gathered outside the court to demonstrate their support
for Liu also wore yellow ribbons or tied them to the railings outside the
court. In other cases, large numbers of netizens have placed images of the
person they’re concerned about on their microblog, QQ, or Twitter banner
– for example, photos of Chen Guangcheng, “Pearl” He Peirong, or Li
Wangyang. In the course of its long involvement in rights defence cam-
paigns, Gongmeng appealed on its website for unified use of “citizen” sym-
bols. In addition, symbols such as the “Grass Mud Horse” or “River Crab,”
and texts created by netizens, have been used for the purposes of protest,
satire, or deconstruction. (89) I refer to this phenomenon as “emblem cam-
paigns.” These symbols are very eye-catching, and through shared symbol
tagging, netizens can recognise the like-minded among them, promoting a
psychological identity among participants in social movements and building
up a formidable momentum for protest. It likewise facilitates offline contact
and campaign coordination.
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Online publications
The Chinese government strictly prohibits privately-published newspapers.
In terms of the Internet, however, there is no longer any genuine technical
barrier to private publication. A typical example is Yibao (“One Man’s Paper,”
www.1bao.org), published by Zhai Minglei. In addition, the Internet has
many “personal newspaper services” such as Paper.li, which aggregate and
filter news from social networks such as Twitter and Facebook, and then
turn the content into an online daily.
Flash mobs
The flash mob is a phenomenon in which a group of people gathers at a
time and place arranged in advance through the Internet or text messaging,
then carries out a designated action (such as applauding or shouting slo-
gans) before disappearing in an instant. An unsuccessful “Free Chen
Guangcheng Beijing flash mob” was organised in April 2010. A more recent
action occurred at 9:00 p.m. on 10 May 2012, when a huge number of post-
ings supporting You Minglei simultaneously appeared on all of the major
microblogs. (90)
Human flesh search engines and name lists
Although human flesh search engines have been confronted by a number
of legal and ethical controversies, carrying out searches to identify perpe-
trators continues to draw the support of netizens on certain hot-button is-
sues. Some more recent examples include the forced abortion case in
Ankang, Shaanxi Province, (91) and a protest regarding a molybdenum-copper
project in Shifang County, Sichuan Province. (92) Netizens tracked down a
head nurse involved in the first case, and a “fat policeman” who had been
responsible for beatings in the second case.
Ai Weiwei carried out a citizen’s investigation to identify child victims of
the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. He was able to identify 5,212 young victims,
and listed their names on the Internet, as well as memorialising them on
their birthdays. In 2010, he similarly launched an investigation to identify
the victims of a massive fire in Shanghai’s Jing’an District. After a major
fire in Tianjin’s Ji County in June 2012, someone used Google Docs in an
attempt to challenge the officially published name list. Some rights de-
fenders have also used Internet technology to compile name lists of polit-
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Human rights (weiquan) lawyers and rights defenders gather outside the Court of Linyi City (Shandong Province) on 20 July 2006
to show solidarity with blind rights advocate Chen Guangcheng, accused of ‘damaging public property’ and ‘causing a traffic
disturbance,’ and his defence lawyers (the authorities on that day postponed the trial). Cheng’s supporters are each wearing a shirt
with his picture and the words ‘Blind – Chen Guangcheng – Freedom’.
© Teng Biao
ical prisoners. (93) Special websites and Twitter accounts have been set up
to collect name lists of evildoers, and to collect information on secret po-
lice, procurators, and judges involved in persecuting prisoners of conscience.
Apart from the afore-mentioned forms, there are also online ballots, video
conferencing, online seminars, Internet publications, etc.; it could be said
that not a day passes without a new method of online social movements
being created. What should be noted is that these various online and offline
rights defence campaigns are seldom used in isolation, but are more typi-
cally used in combination. The Qiu Qingfeng incident in 2000 is believed to
be “China’s first protest using a combination of online and offline meth-
ods.” (94) The 2003 Li Siyi incident resulted in a flood of essays, songs, and
reports; a memorial website was established through which people could
offer flowers and songs, light candles and incense, and perform libations,
and Ren Bumei, Wen Kejian, and Qin Geng took part in a relay hunger
strike. (95) Another example of a successful rights defence case is Feng
Zhenghu’s struggle in 2009 for his right to return to his country. Feng re-
ceived online and offline support through in-kind donations, text messages,
and direct twitter messages. (96) The melamine milk powder contamination
incident drew inter alia open letters, the organisation of meetings of the
parents of victims, paid advertisements in Southern Weekend, the organi-
sation of a legal team and legal aid for lawsuits, media and Internet mobil-
isation, the filing of lawsuits in Hong Kong, negotiations with the factory
owners, banners in the streets, and academic symposia. (97) The campaign to
rescue Chen Guangcheng adopted an even richer array of activities: protests
outside court, letter-writing campaigns, sending milk powder and school
supplies to Chen’s children, visits, setting off fireworks and releasing bal-
loons, altering Twitter or microblog banners, wearing “Guangcheng shirts,”
Guangcheng bumper stickers, the production of videos and documentaries,
people’s awards, telephoning local government officials to protest and post-
ing the audio recording on the Internet, street performance art, taking pic-
tures of dark glasses and posting the photos on the Internet, setting up
special websites, circulating open letters, disseminating leaflets, posting on-
line advertisements for marriage partners, (98) and other examples too nu-
merous to list here.
Rights defence campaigns constantly intersect and coordinate online and
offline. This is sometimes referred to as the “three-dimensional rights de-
fence model […] flexibly integrating seven key elements: domestic media
reports, on-site guidance, investigation and analysis, court litigation support,
consolidation of public opinion through the Internet, proposals for systemic
reform, and monitoring by the international community (through interna-
tional media and international relations). […] It combines systematic reform
campaigns with unsystematic social movements.” (99)
Conclusion
An authority on social movements, Charles Tilly, believes that social move-
ments have three key elements: 1) campaigns: “A sustained, organised public
effort making collective claims on target authorities”; 2) social movement
repertoire defined as the “Employment of combinations from among the
following forms of political action: Creation of special-purpose associations
and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demon-
strations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphle-
teering”; 3) so-called “WUNC displays”: an acronym for "participants’
concerted public representation of […] worthiness, unity, numbers, and
commitments on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies". (100)
Viewed from this angle, China’s rights defence movement qualifies as a so-
cial movement in progress. Some researchers describe and analyse the rights
defence movement under the framework of social movements. For example,
Li Fan believes that modern China’s “freedom and civil rights movement”
has the following characteristics: demanding clear objectives of social liberty
and the safeguarding of rights and interests; sustained posting of these de-
mands in one locality after another throughout China; organisation and in-
teraction between different groups is limited but emerging; and the
methods for expressing demands is diverse and constantly growing. (101) This
movement has not reached the stage of “possessing a unified comprehen-
sive organisational hub, but is scattered and spontaneous, able to arise and
die out at a moment’s notice, but also able to be revived at a moment’s
notice. Overall, it embodies a state of continuous development.” (102)
China’s rights defence movement has its own unique aspects: 1) A low
level of organisation. The rights defence movement has multiple hubs and
a low level of organisation. NGOs are not the mainstream, and the move-
ment is subject to enormous constraints. There exist some informal organ-
isations, for example regular or irregular gatherings of civil society activists,
and legal teams that cooperate when the opportunity arises, form around
cases, and then dissolve after a case is finished. This is mainly for the purpose
of reducing risk in an atmosphere of intense political pressure. 2) Multilevel
appeals. There is the safeguarding of lawful rights and interests in individual
cases, the promotion of changes to a law or policy, the defence of freedom
of expression or worship and other such constitutional rights, and the kind
of demand for systemic political reform seen in Charter ‘08. Opinions still
diverge within the rights defence movement regarding appeals for political
reform and over whether the rights defence movement needs to become
politicised. 3) Multilevel actions. Some rights defence actions are very mod-
est: a microblog exposing an environmental pollution problem, a small-scale
petition, a research report or a symposium. Some are extremely radical, such
as self-immolation or hunger strikes. Opinions continue to diverge over
whether it is right to stage a hunger strike, “take to the streets,” or publicly
defend Falun Gong.
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As to the “full use” of legal space, it can in fact serve the purpose of safe-
guarding justice in individual cases or improving particular provisions of bad
law, but is it possible through this method to turn China into a constitutional
state? Will demanding that the government observe its laws be enough to
achieve civil liberty and then move toward democratisation? The avoidance
of organisation can in fact reduce (though not eliminate) risk, but without
organisation, can the rights defence movement become a high-quality, ef-
fective social movement? Might a rights defence movement shackled by
“legalisation of political issues and specialisation of legal issues” end up
binding itself hand and foot? Can rights defence pick and choose, refusing
to take on the most sensitive cases and topics?
These controversies began as early as 2005, when lawyer Gao Zhisheng
wrote his open letter on the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners, (103)
and they remain current today. In a 2006 essay, Gao argued that the rights
defence movement should “become non-violent, politicised, and organised,
and should take to the streets.” Microblog discussions over the need for a
more organised rights defence movement following Sichuan’s Shifang inci-
dent and Fujian’s Qidong Incident show that the debate continues. (104) The
omnidirectional influence new networking technologies have had on the
rights defence movement may eventually result in new conclusions.
The core of the movement is human activity. The enhancement of trans-
portation and communication has clearly extended the scope of activities
and the capacity for association, which in turn has had a marked effect on
social mobilisation and collective action. One example is that petitioning
becoming a social issue in the 1990s due in part to improved rail speeds
and the construction of many expressways. (105) According to Marshall
McLuhan, the media are “extensions of man.” (106) The influence of the In-
ternet on the media can be seen in these new phrases: we media; public
media; republic media, social media, participatory media, collaborative
media, common-shared media, etc. (107) The new media have in fact trans-
formed the traditional meaning of space and time. Manuel Castells points
out that the world has shifted from a “space of places” to a “space of flows,”
and that the space of flows in information society is allocative; a person’s
social function is basically organised within this space of flows. (108) According
to Paul Virilio, what we call the world no longer refers to geographic expanse,
but rather to “a temporal distance constantly being decreased by our trans-
portation, transmission, and tele-action capacities.” (109)
In the Information Age, a person can become an operative (such as a par-
ticipant in a social movement) even when physically absent; complete in
advance an action that will be required at some future time; (110) exert power
through anonymous means; and influence actual social incidents from a
virtual space. The cost and risk of participating in movements has been
greatly reduced, and an accumulation of “micro-dynamics” can wield out-
standing power. “Speaking only of the individual netizen, his every strike on
the keyboard, every reply, comment, or forwarding of a posting seems so
small that its effects can be overlooked. When he does this, he may not
know where his comrades and companions are. But when these apparently
impotent and isolated actions come together, a lone clap becomes an ova-
tion, a small crowd expands to a mass, and strangers are assembled into a
resonant action group.” (111) This is also the reason why civil action has be-
come increasingly dynamic, even though the government has been unceas-
ing in its suppression of the rights defence movement.
The quandary of “systematisation” seems to have become a bottleneck
in the rights defence movement. Even so, BBS, Twitter, Skype, email, mail
list, QQ, QQ groups, microblogs, blogs, microblog groups, etc., as well as the
increasing popularisation of cellular phones, have allowed for the synchro-
nised dissemination of information, immediate group contact, and multi-
party online interaction, and thus have greatly changed the face of
interpersonal exchanges and alliances. New Internet technology also has
the capacity to assemble information into types, as well as assembling peo-
ple with the same convictions, greatly facilitating the mobilisation of public
opinion and social mobilisation, and leading to the emergence of new types
of associative formations, such as virtual associations and online commu-
nities, which to a certain extent can break through prohibitions on “banned
associations.” “Virtual associations,” “online communities,” “informal organ-
isations,” “covert organisations,” “temporary organisations” – whatever
name they go by, these “quasi-organisations” have already become a social
reality. Constant exchanges between individuals with shared concerns and
viewpoints in virtual space have also made offline face-to-face exchanges
and gatherings a matter of course. It is through this practice that citizens’
self-organisational capacities can gradually take shape and improve. This is
what Clay Shirky refers to as “organizing without organizations,” (112) and
Sidney Tarrow believes, “It was not so much these formal organizations, but
the informal social networks that lay at their heart and the informal con-
nective structures among them that were potential centers of collective ac-
tion... Less easily infiltrated by the police than formal associations and less
subject to factionalization, informal networks had advantages during a time
when governments were becoming increasingly wary of combination.” (113)
Before and even since the rise of the rights defence movement’s, people
have not abandoned efforts toward organised protest, as illustrated by the
creation of political parties such as the Chinese Liberal Democratic Party,
the Chinese Workers’ Rights Protection Alliance, and the China Democracy
Party, and groups such as the Tiananmen Mothers, the Pan-Blue Alliance,
the Chinese Independent PEN Centre, the Guizhou human rights seminars,
various house-churches, and the Open Constitution Initiative. Nevertheless,
mobilisation and organisation in the Internet Age allow for collective action
and social movements without organisational structure, charters, or fixed
membership, without leaders and without advance planning. The traditional
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concept of organisation is increasingly subverted by Internet technology
and actual practice.
To a certain extent, therefore, the Internet has broken down a number of
traditional dichotomies: information disseminators vs information recipi-
ents; official media vs popular media; domestic media vs foreign media; do-
mestic vs foreign; on-site vs off-site; organised vs individual; elite vs
grassroots; public domain vs private domain; traditional activity vs virtual
activity; and even political vs apolitical; online vs offline; and the powerful
vs the powerless. Havel said that that living in truth is the “power of the
powerless”; (114) networking technology is likewise the power of the power-
less. The Internet has become “liberation technology” (115) due to Web 2.0
social movements’ gradual subversion of existing associative power struc-
tures. (116)
Under a political structure with freedom of expression and association,
civil society “first located breaches through the Internet, and once the In-
ternet set down roots, brought about spontaneous alliances in the virtual
world. Civic collective movements then progressively infiltrated, influenced,
pushed forward, and altered reality. Civic collective movements in China
were once unimaginable, but with the help of the Internet and public opin-
ion forums driven by the Internet, they have become a reality, and are cre-
ating one miracle after another in China’s public life.” (117) China’s rights
defence movement has achieved much in the space of just ten years. Land-
marks include: the Sun Zhigang incident, the Taishi Village incident, the Chen
Guangcheng incident, the Xiamen PX incident, Charter ‘08, Ai Weiwei’s
Sichuan earthquake investigation, the Guizhou human rights seminars,
Huang Qi’s 6.4 Tianwang website and Liu Feiyue’s Livelihood Watch, the
Deng Yujiao case, the Qian Yunhui incident, (118) the Li Zhuang case, the in-
cident of the Three Fujian Netizens, the Wukan incident, the participation
of independent candidates in the 2011 people’s congress elections,
Guiyang’s Li Qinghong case, Gongmeng’s push for the equal right to edu-
cation, and the “New Citizens’ Movement.” 
The main developer of Twitter, Jack Dorsey, once said: “One could
change the world with one hundred and forty characters.” In terms of
China’s political transformation, the situation is of course much more
difficult and complex; it will take more than mouse clicks, and will require
the much greater energy of offline collective action. In recent years, many
public intellectuals and activists have given the optimistic prognosis that
“the surrounding gaze is changing China.” The Internet has already
brought enormous transformation to the concepts and modes of dissem-
ination of information, personal interaction, social mobilisation, and po-
litical movements. Against this background, the various online and offline
activities of participants in China’s rights defence movement are chang-
ing China.
z Translated from Chinese by Stacy Mosher.
z Teng Biao is a Lecturer at China University of Political Science and
Law; he practices law at the Beijing Huayi Law Firm, and is the Direc-
tor of China Against Death Penalty, Beijing. He holds a PhD from
Peking University Law School. He is also a Visiting Scholar with the
Centre for Rights and Justice at the Faculty of Law, The Chinese Uni-
versity of Hong Kong, in the academic year 2012/2013. In 2003, he
was one of the “Three Doctors of Law” who complained to the Na-
tional People’s Congress about unconstitutional detentions of inter-
nal migrants in the widely known “Sun Zhigang Case.” Since then,
Teng Biao has provided counsel in numerous other human rights
cases, including those of rural rights advocate Chen Guangcheng,
rights defender Hu Jia, the religious freedom case of Wang Bo, and
numerous death  penalty cases. He has also co-founded two groups
that have combined research with work on human rights cases: “Open
Constitution Initiative” (Gongmeng / now Gongmin) and “China
Against Death Penalty” (tengbiao89@gmail.com).
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